Gender differences in alternating-offer bargaining: an experimental study
通过实验室实验，研究在结构化交替出价谈判中，关于分配规范的模糊性如何影响性别差异，发现对称环境下无性别差异，不对称环境下男性更难达成协议但分得更多，总体收入无差异但男性谈判对手收入更低。
Abstract A laboratory study was carried out to analyze the relationship between ambiguity regarding the sharing norms in structured alternating-offer bargaining and gender differences in bargaining. Symmetric environments, where a 50:50 split emerges as the unique sensible norm, showed the lowest ambiguity and gender differences are absent. We increased ambiguity by introducing asymmetries into the bargaining environment by making one bargaining party get a higher share than the other (due to empowerment, entitlement or informational asymmetries), but without imposing new sharing norms. In these situations, men are less likely to reach an agreement, but, when they do, they obtain a larger share of the pie. As a result, men and women show similar overall earnings but earnings are lower when bargaining with men. We find suggestive evidence that gender differences diminish when we reduce ambiguity regarding the sharing norms by providing information about other participants’ agreements in asymmetric environments.