Moral hazard in teams with subjective evaluations
研究了团队中工人工资同时依赖客观团队产出和主观评价（包括自评和互评）时的道德风险问题，发现评价主观性降低时工资应更敏感于评价和团队产出，且主观评价仅在主观性不高时采用相对比较。
Abstract This article studies moral hazard in teams where workers' wages depend on two types of performance measures: objective team output and subjective evaluations. The evaluations include both self‐ and peer evaluations. I find that when evaluations become less subjective, workers' wages should be more sensitive not only to their evaluations but also to the team's output. I also show that subjective evaluations should be used in relative terms only when the degree of subjectivity is not too high. The results also associate the introduction of a budget breaker with the level of subjectivity within organizations.