When Can Decision Makers Learn from Financial Market Prices?
研究政策制定者如何从金融市场价格中获取信息以优化决策，推导出完全揭示均衡存在的条件，并讨论其在银行监管、中央银行及资产设计中的应用。
Abstract I analyze a general setting where a policymaker needs information that financial market traders have in order to implement optimal policy, and prices can potentially reveal this information. Policy decisions, in turn, affect asset values. I derive a condition for the existence of fully revealing equilibria in competitive financial markets, which identifies all situations where learning from prices for policy purposes works. I discuss the possibility of using market information for banking supervision and central banking, and the general problem of asset design. I also demonstrate that some corporate prediction markets are ill‐designed, and show how to fix it.