The Psychology of Second Guesses: Implications for the Wisdom of the Inner Crowd
研究发现，让人们在第二次猜测前明确判断第一次猜测是过高还是过低，会改变内部群体智慧效应：对于非极端正确答案的问题，该效应减弱甚至逆转；对于极端正确答案的问题，该效应增强。
Prior research suggests that averaging two guesses from the same person can improve quantitative judgments, a phenomenon known as the “wisdom of the inner crowd.” In this article, we find that this effect hinges on whether people explicitly decide in which direction their first guess had erred before making their second guess. In nine studies (N = 8,465), we found that asking people to explicitly indicate whether their first guess was too high or too low before making their second guess made people more likely to provide a second guess that was more extreme (in the same direction) than their first guess. As a consequence, the introduction of that “Too High/Too Low” question reduced (and sometimes eliminated or reversed) the wisdom-of-the-inner-crowd effect for (the majority of) questions with non-extreme correct answers and increased the wisdom-of-the-inner-crowd effect for questions with extreme correct answers. Our findings suggest that the wisdom-of-the-inner-crowd effect is not inevitable but rather that it depends on the processes people use to generate their second guesses. This paper was accepted by Yuval Rottenstreich, decision analysis.