Labor Market Responses to Unemployment Insurance: The Role of Heterogeneity
研究发现失业者内部存在显著异质性，尤其是按失业保险资格和领取情况划分时；通过异质性代理人求职模型匹配财富与收入差异，揭示保险收益对财富匮乏的领取者更大，而激励成本随财富非单调变化，表明考虑领取者构成对评估失业保险的保险-激励权衡至关重要。
We document considerable scope of heterogeneity within the unemployed, especially when they are divided along eligibility for and receipt of unemployment insurance (UI). We study the implications of this heterogeneity on UI’s insurance-incentive trade-off using a heterogeneous-agent job search model capable of matching the wealth and income differences that distinguish UI recipients from nonrecipients. Insurance benefits are larger for UI recipients who are predominantly wealth poor. Meanwhile, incentive costs are nonmonotonic in wealth because the poorest individuals, who value employment, exhibit weak responses. Differential elasticities imply that accounting for the composition of recipients is material to the evaluation of UI’s insurance-incentive trade-off.