Corporate social responsibility and operating cash flows management: An examination of credit market incentives
研究发现，面临财务困境或信用评级接近投资级边缘的企业，更可能通过分类调整而非时间安排来虚报经营现金流，且在公司治理较弱时这种行为更明显，可能损害股东利益。
Abstract This paper examines whether firms that engage in corporate social responsibility activities (CSR firms) manage reported cash flows from operations (CFO) when they have strong credit market incentives. We find that CSR firms near financial distress and those having a long‐term credit rating near the investment/non‐investment grade cutoff are more likely to inflate reported CFO, compared to all other firms. We also find evidence that CSR firms with these credit market incentives appear to resort mainly to classification rather than timing as a tool for managing CFO. Further, we find that the degree of CFO management performed by those CSR firms is more pronounced under weaker corporate governance. Overall, our findings suggest that CSR firms with stronger credit market incentives are more likely to manage CFO, and that such CFO management behavior is likely to be implemented at the expense of shareholders’ interest.