Partial information disclosure in a contest
研究了竞赛中一方拥有私人信息时，设计者如何通过部分信息披露来激励参与者付出更多努力，并考虑了某些类型参与者不付出努力的情况。
Zhang and Zhou (2016) use the concept of Bayesian persuasion due to Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) to analyze information disclosure in a contest with one-sided asymmetric information. They show that an effort-maximizing designer can manipulate information disclosure to increase expected efforts in the contest, based upon active contest participation by all types of the informed player. We allow some informed types to exert no effort in the contest, showing how this (i) can increase the applicability of the previous results, and (ii) in some cases, can change the type of information disclosure.