Too Much Skin-in-the-Game? The Effect of Mortgage Market Concentration on Credit and House Prices
研究了2007-2008年美国住房市场衰退期间，大型贷款机构为支撑房价而增加高风险贷款的行为，并构建理论模型解释这一现象。
Abstract In 2007, as American housing markets started to decline, the government-sponsored enterprises dramatically increased their acquisitions of low FICO and high loan-to-value mortgages. By 2008, the agencies had reversed course by decreasing their high-risk acquisitions. I develop a theory in which large lenders temporarily increase high-risk activity at the end of a boom. In the model, lenders with many outstanding mortgages have incentives to extend risky credit to prop up house prices. The increase in house prices lessens the losses they make on their outstanding portfolio of mortgages. As the bust continues, lenders slowly wind down their mortgage exposure.