Mayoral preferences for delegation in collaborative arrangements: issue salience and policy specificity
通过一项对240位哥伦比亚市长的调查实验，研究议题具体性和显著性如何影响市长在市政协会合作中授权资金分配的偏好，发现市长普遍不愿授权，且议题显著性无影响，但政策具体性会降低对区域协会的授权意愿。
Multilevel governance offers different settings to study executive decision-making and delegation. Associations of municipalities (AoMs), which are collaborative partnerships, are understudied arrangements in the delegation literature. Using a survey experiment with 240 Colombian mayors, this research explores whether issue specificity and issue salience shift preferences for delegating funding appropriations. Mayors overall prefer not to delegate and shifts in issue salience do not affect these preferences. Yet, mayors are less likely to delegate to regional AoMs when facing a policy-specific scenario. Moreover, this effect is contingent upon municipal population due to the relevance of cognitive shortcuts in more complex scenarios.