Do Institutional Transplants Succeed? Regulating Raiffeisen Cooperatives in South India, 1930–1960
研究了英属印度政府移植合作社制度以与私人放贷者竞争，但合作社虽增加信贷供应却市场份额小且持续亏损，原因在于低储蓄限制了社会资本作用，以及重公平轻效率的意识形态导致监管薄弱。
The government in British-ruled India established cooperative banks to compete with private moneylenders in the rural credit market. State officials expected greater competition to increase the supply of low-cost credit, thereby expanding investment potential for the rural poor. Cooperatives did increase credit supply but captured a small share of the credit market and reported net losses throughout the late colonial and early postcolonial period. The article asks why this experiment did not succeed and offers two explanations. First, low savings restricted the role of social capital and mutual supervision as methods of financial regulation in the cooperative sector. Second, a political-economic ideology that privileged equity over efficiency made for weak administrative regulation.