Leader Effects in Competition among Teams: Evidence from a Field Intervention
通过拉美银行的现场实验，研究领导激励对团队绩效的影响，发现激励效果因领导风格和团队特征而异。
ABSTRACT This paper investigates whether leadership style moderates the effect of leader incentives on the performance of teams. In collaboration with a Latin-American bank, we engineered a field experiment by designing a series of contests among the bank branches with varying prize structures. We find evidence that providing explicit incentives to team leaders has a positive effect on team performance. However, the effect of incentives differs based on the manager's leadership style and team characteristics. Leader incentives are less effective for managers who inspire their team by appealing to higher values than for managers who motivate performance through rewards and penalties. JEL Classifications: D23; M40; M46; M50; M52; M55.