On the optimality of outsourcing when vertical integration can mitigate information asymmetries
研究了买卖双方交易中间品时，卖方拥有成本私人信息，买方在非一体化下无法验证成本，而在纵向一体化下可以验证，但双方仍可能偏好非一体化。
Consider a buyer and a seller who have agreed to trade an intermediate good. It is ex-post efficient to adapt the good to the prevailing state of the world. The seller has private information about the costs of adapting the good. In the case of non-integration, the buyer has no possibility to verify claims that the seller makes about her costs. In the case of vertical integration, the buyer can verify evidence about the costs that the seller might be able to provide. Even though we assume no further differences between the ownership structures, it turns out that the parties may prefer non-integration.