The relevance of investor rights in crowdinvesting
研究了德国众筹合同中现金权、控制权和退出权对投资者价格、众筹结果及后续融资的影响，发现更多权利虽对应更高价格，但不影响众筹成功、后续融资或破产概率。
A common assumption is that entrepreneurs retain more control of their venture when opting for crowdinvesting rather than venture capital. In this article, we investigate the relevance of cash-flow, control, and exit rights awarded to crowd investors in Germany, where more flexible contracts are offered than in many other jurisdictions. In Germany, many of the rights used in venture capital investment contracts are also prevalent in crowdinvesting contracts. We find that crowd investors are asked to pay higher prices if they receive more cash-flow and exit rights, consistent with the view that these rights are valuable to the crowd. However, we find no evidence that these rights affect campaign outcome, the likelihood of securing follow-on funding, or the insolvency likelihood of the venture. We interpret this as evidence that the redemption rights stipulated in the contract make other types of control rights less relevant or investors' actions are ineffective. Furthermore, crowd investors neither trigger insolvency proceedings nor mention the enforcement of their contractual rights in investor communication blogs or popular media.