In Defense of Limited Manufacturing Cost Control: Disciplining Acquisition of Private Information by Suppliers
研究发现，企业适度容忍内部生产的低效率，可以可信地承诺在与供应商谈判时更强势，从而抑制供应商获取和谎报私有信息的动机，最终促进高效外包。
ABSTRACT When a firm's input supplier can acquire and misreport private information to gain an edge in negotiations, we show that the firm can blunt the supplier's informational advantage by permitting inefficiencies in its own internal production. Specifically, we establish that a modest increase in the cost of the input(s) a firm makes internally credibly commits it to be more aggressive in negotiations with a supplier for the input(s) the firm buys. Recognizing that its potential information rents will be limited, the supplier, in turn, becomes less aggressive in information acquisition. The paper fully characterizes the equilibrium—the firm's investments, the supplier's information acquisition and reporting decisions, and the terms of trade—to demonstrate that often-maligned internal bloat can be an endogenous facilitator of efficient outsourcing.