Procedural Politics Revisited: Institutional Incentives and Jurisdictional Ambiguity in EU Competence Disputes
本文用20年新数据检验程序政治理论，发现管辖权模糊和制度激励仍能解释欧盟机构间的法律依据争议，但该现象目前趋于尾声。
Abstract Over 15 years ago Joseph Jupille articulated the conditions under which actors clash over, rather than merely within, political institutions. He showed that between 1987 and 1997 the theory of procedural politics helped explain why and when EU institutions contested the legal basis of EU legislation. The two key determinants in the theory are jurisdictional ambiguity and actors' desire to maximize their own procedural influence. This article examines the theory's ongoing relevance by putting it through a fresh test with 20 years' worth of new data. Although I find robust evidence of the theory's explanatory value beyond 1997, the phenomenon of procedural politics appears currently at its tail end, largely consistent with Jupille's prediction that treaty change increases the probability of institutional contestation.