Contracts, pay and performance in the sport of kings: Evidence from horse racing
研究了赛马骑师从完全绩效薪酬转为固定工资合同后，并未出现偷懒行为，反而精英骑师在合同到期后仍保持优异表现，这可能源于监督成本的降低。
Abstract A considerable body of evidence shows that performance‐related pay schemes can raise worker productivity with much of this increase due to worker sorting. However, variations in the power of performance‐related pay contracts are rarely observed. The thoroughbred horse racing industry offers such an opportunity. Contrary to earlier research, we find no evidence of worker shirking when the power of incentive contracts is reduced through jockeys switching from complete performance‐related pay schemes into a salaried (retainer) contract. Moreover, salary contracts result in legacy effects with superior performance continuing for elite jockeys even after their salary agreements have expired. We argue this is due to a reduction in monitoring costs.