Do Managers Do Good with Other People’s Money?
利用2003年股利税削减这一外生冲击，研究发现税后内部人持股增加使中等内部人持股企业的社会责任评级下降、估值上升，支持了企业社会责任支出源于代理问题的观点。
Abstract There is mixed evidence on whether the marginal dollar spent on corporate social responsibility is due to agency problems. We propose an approach by modeling how the 2003 dividend tax cut, which increased after-tax insider ownership and better aligned managerial and shareholder interests, affected the marginal dollar spent on firm responsibility. We confirm key predictions of our agency model: following the tax cut, moderate insider-ownership firms experience larger declines in their responsibility ratings and increases in their valuations relative to other firms. We also confirm another implication regarding managerial misalignment using a regression-discontinuity design of close votes on shareholder-governance proposals. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.