Is No News (Perceived As) Bad News? An Experimental Investigation of Information Disclosure
通过实验室实验检验信息披露理论的核心预测：信息优势方是否会自愿披露信息。实验发现发送者会披露有利信息但隐瞒不利信息，而接收者往往对未披露信息缺乏足够怀疑。
This paper uses laboratory experiments to directly test a central prediction of disclosure theory: that strategic forces can lead those who possess private information to voluntarily provide it. In a simple sender-receiver game, we find that senders disclose favorable information, but withhold unfavorable information. The degree to which senders withhold information is strongly related to their stated beliefs about receiver actions, and their stated beliefs are accurate on average. Receiver actions are also strongly related to their stated beliefs, but their actions and beliefs suggest that many are insufficiently skeptical about nondisclosed information in the absence of repeated feedback.