Bail-Ins and Bailouts: Incentives, Connectivity, and Systemic Stability
研究了监管机构与问题银行债权人之间的战略谈判如何内生决定危机干预方式，发现稀疏的银行网络能增强监管不救助威胁的可信度并减少搭便车行为，从而提升社会福利。
This paper endogenizes intervention in financial crises as the strategic negotiation between a regulator and creditors of distressed banks. Incentives for banks to contribute to a voluntary bail-in arise from their exposure to financial contagion. In equilibrium, a bail-in is possible only if the regulator’s threat to not bail out insolvent banks is credible. Contrary to models without intervention or with government bailouts only, sparse networks enhance welfare for two main reasons: they improve the credibility of the regulator’s no-bailout threat for large shocks, and they reduce free-riding incentives among bail-in contributors when the threat is credible.