Insider–Outsider Labor Markets, Hysteresis, and Monetary Policy
构建了一个包含内部人-外部人劳动力市场和滞后效应的新凯恩斯模型，解释了欧洲失业的高持续性，并研究了该环境对货币政策设计的影响，发现最优政策需强调就业稳定，而标准利率规则无法实现。
Abstract I develop a version of the New Keynesian model with insider–outsider labor markets and hysteresis that can account for the high persistence of European unemployment. I study the implications of that environment for the design of monetary policy. The optimal policy calls for strong emphasis on (un)employment stabilization which a standard interest rate rule fails to deliver, with the gap between the two increasing in the degree of hysteresis. Two simple targeting rules are shown to approximate well the optimal policy. The properties of the model and effects of different policies are analyzed through the lens of the labor wedge and its components.