Partisanship and Fiscal Policy in Economic Unions: Evidence from US States
研究发现，美国州长的党派性影响联邦财政政策效果：共和党州长比民主党州长更少支出联邦转移支付，导致州债务较低、经济活动初期较弱，并影响整个货币联盟的财政乘数。
Partisanship of state governors affects the efficacy of US federal fiscal policy. Using close election data, we find partisan differences in the marginal propensity to spend federal intergovernmental transfers: Republican governors spend less than Democratic governors. Correspondingly, Republican-led states have lower debt, (delayed) lower taxes, and initially lower economic activity. A New Keynesian model of partisan states in a monetary union implies sizable aggregate effects: The intergovernmental transfer impact multiplier rises by 0.58 if Republican governors spend like Democratic governors, but due to delayed tax cuts, the long-run multiplier is higher with more Republican governors, generating an intertemporal policy trade-off.