Strategic Voting in Two-Party Legislative Elections
研究了多选区两党立法选举中，策略性选民如何根据选区在立法机构中的关键性选择投票维度，导致候选人政策选择与单一选区不同，最终政策由选民偏好唯一确定且为孔多塞赢家。
I study multidistrict legislative elections with two parties and two binary dimensions of policy. Strategic voters focus on the dimension where their district is most likely to be pivotal in the legislature. Anticipating this, candidates select different policies than they would in single-district elections. The final policy is (i) uniquely pinned down by voter preferences, (ii) preferred by a majority of districts on each dimension, and (iii) a Condorcet winner if one exists. These properties are not guaranteed in single-district elections.