Optimal Priority-Based Allocation Mechanisms
提出一种可操作的方法来设计最优优先级系统，将代理人分配给异质物品，同时考虑其选择行为，并应用于波士顿小学入学选择，发现限制选择可能有利于学生福利。
This paper develops a tractable methodology for designing an optimal priority system for assigning agents to heterogeneous items while accounting for agents’ choice behavior. The space of mechanisms being optimized includes deferred acceptance and top trading cycles as special cases. In contrast to previous literature, I treat the inputs to these mechanisms, namely the priority distribution of agents and quotas of items, as parameters to be optimized. The methodology is based on analyzing large market models of one-sided matching using techniques from revenue management and solving a certain assortment planning problem whose objective is social welfare. I apply the methodology to school choice and show that restricting choices may be beneficial to student welfare. Moreover, I compute optimized choice sets and priorities for elementary school choice in Boston. This paper was accepted by Gabriel Weintraub, revenue management and market analytics.