Point at, nudge, or push private provision of a public good?
通过在线实验研究默认选项、建议和最低强制捐款对气候保护私人供给的影响，发现这些干预措施提高了人们选择焦点值的倾向，但默认选项与内在动机存在负向交互，专家或政治监管者信息会降低干预效果。
Abstract How decision makers respond to behavioral and traditional interventions might depend on their and the regulator's attributes. This online experiment investigates the effect of defaults, recommendations, and mandatory minimum contributions accompanied by regulator information on the private provision of climate protection, accounting for intrinsic motivation. Findings show that all interventions increase the propensity of individuals to choose the focal value. There is no evidence that recommendations and defaults change average contributions. We report a negative interaction of the default with intrinsic motivation. Expert or political regulator information decreases intervention effectiveness. The study improves our understanding of behavioral public policy instruments.