The logical foundations of constitutional democracy between legal positivism and natural law theory
本文分析了布坎南如何结合法律实证主义与准自然法约束（一致同意与个人否决权）来构建宪政民主的逻辑基础，揭示其融合康德人际尊重理想与宪法经济学的努力及其困境。
Abstract Rejecting all knowledge claims concerning right and wrong in matters practical James Buchanan concurred with legal positivism that invalid law cannot be identified by its substantive content but only by an inherited defect in its factual creation. Beyond correct creation Buchanan proposed as a quasi-natural law constraint that unanimity in the shadow of individual veto power must at least be conceivable if a norm is to be law. The emerging hybrid conception of constitutional law is symptomatic for Buchanan’s never-ending but ultimately futile efforts to incorporate Kantian ideals of interpersonal respect into constitutional economics without imposing them as personal values.