Optimal Taxation of Capital in the Presence of Declining Labor Share
分析了劳动收入占国民收入比重下降对最优拉姆齐税收的影响，发现只有当劳动份额下降源于竞争减弱等提高纯利润份额的机制时，才应提高资本税。对美国经济的量化应用表明，1980年代以来利润份额飙升可支持大幅提高资本所得税。
ABSTRACT We analyze the implications of the decline in labor's share in national income for optimal Ramsey taxation. It is optimal to accompany the decline in labor share by raising capital taxes only if the labor share is falling because of a decline in competition or other mechanisms that raise the share of pure profits. This result holds under various alternative institutional arrangements that are relevant for optimal taxation of capital income. A quantitative application to the US economy shows that soaring profit shares since the 1980s can justify a significantly increasing path of capital income taxes.