A Theory of Zombie Lending
模型分析企业家从关系银行或市场融资时，银行因企业家声誉积累而持续滚动不良贷款，导致僵尸贷款不可避免，且企业家财务约束可缓解该问题。
ABSTRACT An entrepreneur borrows from a relationship bank or the market. The bank has a higher cost of capital but produces private information over time. While the entrepreneur accumulates reputation as the lending relationship continues, asymmetric information is also developed between the bank/entrepreneur and the market. In this setting, zombie lending is inevitable: Once the entrepreneur becomes sufficiently reputable, the bank will roll over loans even after learning bad news, for the prospect of future market financing. Zombie lending is mitigated when the entrepreneur faces financial constraints. Finally, the bank stops producing information too early if information production is costly.