Mobile Collateral versus Immobile Collateral
对比金融危机前后两种金融架构：移动抵押品（允许安全债务自由交易和再抵押）与固定抵押品（如巴塞尔III流动性覆盖率要求短期银行债务一对一由优质债券支持），并参考美国国民银行时代的历史经验，指出固定抵押品制度可能无法降低甚至增加金融脆弱性。
Abstract The financial architecture prior to the recent financial crisis was a system of mobile collateral. Safe debt, whether government bonds or privately produced bonds, that is, asset‐backed securities, could be traded, posted as collateral, and rehypothecated, moving to their highest value use. Since the financial crisis, regulatory changes to the financial architecture have aimed to make collateral immobile, most notably with the BIS liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) for banks that requires that (net) short‐term (uninsured) bank debt (e.g., repo) be backed one‐for‐one with high‐quality bonds. We evaluate this immobile capital system with reference to a previous structurally identical regime that also required that short‐term bank debt be backed by Treasury debt one‐for‐one: the U.S. National Banking Era. The experience of the U.S. National Banking Era suggests that the LCR is unlikely to reduce financial fragility and may increase it.