Collaborative Tax Evasion in the Provision of Services to Consumers: A Field Experiment
在德国两个在线家装服务市场上，研究者扮演消费者，通过是否要求发票来测试卖家的逃税意愿，发现匿名市场逃税普遍，而实名市场需信号合作才逃税，且逃税折扣通常不超过合法需求的税收补贴。
We conduct a field experiment with sellers of home improvement services on two German online markets. We take the role of consumers and vary whether we request an invoice for the delivery of the service. In a market that allows anyone to sell anonymously, a willingness to evade is prevalent. In a market that keeps track of credentials, sellers are only willing to evade when a willingness to collude is signaled. The evasion discount is in most estimates not larger than the tax subsidy for legal demand. Evasion is unlikely to be beneficial for many consumers in our setting.