Do Majority‐of‐Minority Shareholder Voting Rights Reduce Expropriation? Evidence from Related Party Transactions
利用印度关联交易投票规则，研究发现少数股东多数投票机制能有效抑制利益侵占，减少关联交易规模，并提升公司对外资机构的吸引力。
ABSTRACT In the presence of business groups, the expropriation through related party transactions (RPTs) is common and costly to minority shareholders. Using the setting of India's RPT voting rule, I find that a majority‐of‐minority shareholder voting mechanism helps mitigate expropriation. Minority shareholders actively raise their voice against RPT resolutions. A difference‐in‐differences analysis reveals that shareholder voting has a significant deterrence effect on RPT volume. I also find that stock markets react positively to the voting rule's passage, and that the rule makes Indian firms more attractive to foreign institutional investors.