Aiming for the Goal: Contribution Dynamics of Crowdfunding
研究了一个动态贡献博弈，其中投资者为私人利益而贡献，一位公共捐赠者关心项目成功。捐赠者的贡献作为昂贵信号，鼓励面临协调问题的投资者进行社会性生产贡献。通过校准模型和反事实分析，量化了动态信号的协调收益。
We study a dynamic contribution game where investors seek private benefits offered in exchange for contributions, and a single, publicly minded donor values project success. We show that donor contributions serve as costly signals that encourage socially productive contributions by investors who face a coordination problem. Investors and the donor prefer different equilibria, but all benefit in expectation from the donor’s ability to dynamically signal his valuation. We explore various contexts in which our model can be applied and delve empirically into the case of Kickstarter. We calibrate our model and quantify the coordination benefits of dynamic signaling in counterfactuals.