Hedge Fund Activism and Corporate M&A Decisions
研究发现对冲基金激进主义会减少公司并购数量和溢价，但提升并购后的股票和经营业绩，通过改善治理来优化并购决策。
This paper shows that hedge fund activism is associated with a decrease in mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and offer premiums and an increase in stock and operating performance. Activist hedge funds improve target firms’ M&A performance by reducing poor M&A, diversifying M&A, and the M&A of firms with multiple business segments. Activist hedge funds improve target firms’ M&A decisions by influencing their governance practices. We show that our results are unlikely driven by selection bias. Overall, activist hedge funds play an important role in the market for corporate control by increasing the efficiency of target firms’ M&A activities through interventions. This paper was accepted by Gustavo Manso, finance.