Debt Overhang, Rollover Risk, and Corporate Investment: Evidence from the European Crisis
利用跨国企业-银行匹配数据，研究发现危机前高杠杆的欧洲企业在危机后投资下降更多，且主权压力下银行脆弱性加剧了短期债务企业的展期风险，解释了约20%的私人投资累计下降。
Abstract We quantify the role of financial leverage behind the sluggish post-crisis investment performance of European firms. We use a cross-country firm-bank matched database to identify separate roles for firm leverage, bank balance sheet weaknesses arising from sovereign risk, and aggregate demand conditions. We find that firms entering the crisis with higher debt levels reduce their investment more after the crisis. This negative effect is stronger for firms holding short-term debt in countries whose banks are weak due to sovereign stress, consistent with rollover risk being an important channel influencing investment. The negative effect of firm leverage on investment is also persistent for several years after the shock in the countries with sovereign stress. The corporate leverage channel can explain about 20% of the cumulative decline in aggregate private sector investment over the crisis period.