Spatial Coordination and Joint Bidding in Conservation Auctions
通过实验室实验研究保护拍卖中联合投标能否提升空间协调效果，发现单独投标的集聚奖金已足够时联合投标无益，无奖金时联合投标改善环境但可能降低成本效率。
Spatial coordination of land use change is pivotal in agri-environmental policy to improve the delivery of environmental goods. This paper implements a laboratory experiment to study spatial coordination in a conservation auction. In addition to letting individual producers bid competitively against each other to supply environmental goods, we ask whether opportunities for joint bidding can enhance spatial coordination in the auction cost-effectively. Auction performance depends on the nature of incentives for individual bids; in particular, whether an agglomeration bonus is offered for individual bids. With an individual bonus in place, joint bidding gives no improvement in either environmental benefits procured or cost-effectiveness. Absent an individual bonus, joint bidding improves environmental performance but can decrease cost-effectiveness. Further, across both individual and joint bidding treatments, the average environmental benefits, degree of spatial coordination, and cost-effectiveness are greater, and amount of seller markups lower, with multiple-round bidding compared to single-round bidding.