Physician Practice Organization and Negotiated Prices: Evidence from State Law Changes
利用州级法律变化，研究发现非竞争协议可执行性提高10%导致医生价格上升4.3%，并降低执业规模和集中度；大型执业在固定成本高的服务上价格更低，但企业集中度提高会推高价格。
We study the relationship between physician organizational structures and prices negotiated with private insurers. Using variation caused by state-level judicial law changes, we show that a 10 percent increase in the enforceability of noncompete agreements (NCAs) causes 4.3 percent higher physician prices, and declines in practice sizes and concentration. Using two databases containing every physician establishment and firm between 1996 and 2007, linked to negotiated prices, we show that larger practices have lower prices for services with high fixed costs, consistent with economies of scale. In contrast, increases in firm concentration conditional on establishment concentration leads to higher prices.