Regulation of Charlatans in High‐Skill Professions
研究了高需求低供给技能市场中，骗子作为均衡结果存在时，减少骗子的监管会因竞争降低而损害消费者剩余，但可能使生产者受益，并分析了不同监管类型对总剩余的影响。
ABSTRACT We model a market for a skill in short supply and high demand, where the presence of charlatans (professionals who sell a service they do not deliver on) is an equilibrium outcome. In the model, reducing the number of charlatans through regulation lowers consumer surplus because of the resulting reduction in competition among producers. Producers can benefit from this reduction, potentially explaining the regulation we observe. The effect on total surplus depends on the type of regulation. We derive the factors that drive the cross‐sectional variation in charlatans (regulation) across professions.