Water theft as social insurance: south‐eastern Spain, 1851–1948†
研究了西班牙东南部灌溉社区如何通过灵活惩罚偷水行为来维持稳定，发现这种惩罚机制在干旱期为农民提供了社会保险，并利用1851-1948年的数据验证了模型。
Abstract For centuries, irrigation communities in south‐eastern Spain were socially stable and economically efficient. In this article, we show how these self‐governing institutions persisted by resolving conflicts over scarce resources with flexible punishment for water theft. We argue that variable penalties for violating irrigation rules provided social insurance to farmers during droughts. We develop a dynamic model in which judges trade off crime deterrence and social insurance, and test its predictions using a novel dataset on water theft in the self‐governed irrigation community of Mula, Spain, from 1851 to 1948. For the same offence, we show that recidivists were punished more harshly than first‐time offenders. When the defendant was wealthy, as indicated by the honorific title don , or the victim was poor, judgements were stricter.