Sharing R&D Risk in Healthcare via FDA Hedges
提出一种名为FDA对冲的新金融工具，在FDA审批失败时支付，以消除药物研发的资金缺口，并实证表明该风险是特质性的，分担风险能促进福利提升的研发。
Abstract Biomedical innovation suffers from a “funding gap” between the needs of drug development firms and the availability of funds. The requirement of large investments for drug development projects and the high pipeline risk associated with FDA approval causes this funding gap in part. In this paper, we propose a new financial instrument—the “FDA hedge”—that pays off upon FDA approval failure. We develop a theory to show that the FDA hedge can help eliminate the funding gap. Using novel project-level data, we establish empirically that FDA hedge risk is idiosyncratic, and show how better sharing this risk can spur welfare-enhancing R&D. (JEL G11, G13, G22, I11, L65, O32 Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.