Fiscal Stimulus of Last Resort
研究在名义利率下限约束下，债务目标规则会加剧流动性陷阱，而积极的可持续财政政策能帮助经济摆脱陷阱，但过度刺激可能导致全球不确定性。
Abstract I examine global dynamics in a monetary model with overlapping generations of finite‐horizon agents, nonseparable preferences over consumption and real money balances, and a binding lower bound on nominal interest rates. Debt targeting rules exacerbate the possibility of self‐fulfilling liquidity traps, for agents expect austerity following deflationary slumps. Conversely, activist but sustainable fiscal policy regimes—implementing intertemporally balanced tax cuts and/or transfer increases in response to disinflationary trajectories—are capable of escaping liquidity traps and embarking inflation into a globally stable path that converges to the target. Should fiscal stimulus of last resort be overly aggressive, however, spiral dynamics around the liquidity‐trap steady state exist, causing global indeterminacy.