Understanding “Wage Theft”: Evasion and avoidance responses to minimum wage increases
研究发现最低工资上涨导致低于最低工资的支付现象增多，低估涨幅的12%至17%；可预测、适度且规律的上调合规性更高，而立法推动的上调则相反，且执法力度影响合规模式。
This paper presents strong evidence that minimum wage increases lead to a greater prevalence of subminimum wage payment. Using the Current Population Survey, we estimate that increases in measured underpayment following minimum wage increases average between 12 and 17 percent of realized wage gains. Our baseline analyses focus on workers ages 16 to 25, while additional analyses consider workers ages 16 to 65. In addition, we find that firms and workers comply to a far greater degree with minimum wage increases that are forecastable, modest, and regular than with minimum wage increases enacted through new legislation. We also find evidence that states’ enforcement regimes influence the compliance patterns we observe. We interpret these findings as evidence that while minimum wage compliance is the norm, noncompliance is an important, economically nuanced reality in the low-wage labor market.