Deposit Insurance and Depositor Monitoring: Quasi‐Experimental Evidence from the Creation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
利用1933年和1935年银行法案引入存款保险的自然实验，比较纽约州银行优先存款人和普通存款人对银行资产负债表信息的反应，发现保险降低了存款人的监督动机，但大额未保险存款人仍继续监督。
Abstract The Banking Acts of 1933 and 1935 insured deposits up to $5,000 and limited interest paid by commercial banks. This essay uses a treatment‐and‐control estimation strategy to determine how those reforms influenced depositors’ reactions to information about banks’ balance sheets by comparing preferred and regular depositors at New York state banks. Before deposit insurance, regular depositors reacted more to information about banks, while preferred depositors reacted less. After, this difference diminished and almost disappeared. This change indicates insurance reduced monitoring, although depositors’ continued response to some information indicates that large, uninsured depositors continued to monitor banks, as the legislation intended.