An Economic Analysis of Transnational Bankruptcies
比较了跨国破产中属地主义与普遍主义两种法律规则的经济效应，发现属地主义扭曲投资模式、降低全球福利，并分析了其存在原因及实现普遍主义的路径。
This paper analyzes the effects of the legal rules governing transnational bankruptcies. We compare a regime of “territoriality”—in which assets are adjudicated by the jurisdiction in which they are located at the time of the bankruptcy—with a regime of “universality”—in which all assets are adjudicated in a single jurisdiction. Territoriality is shown to generate a distortion in investment patterns that might lead to an inefficient allocation of capital across countries. We also analyze who gains and who loses from territoriality, explain why countries engage in it even though it reduces global welfare, and identify what can be done to achieve universality.