Intellectual Property Rights and Cannibalization In Information Technology Outsourcing Contracts1
研究了信息技术外包中开发的软件知识产权应如何分配，区分了排他权与使用权，并考虑多用户对客户利益的蚕食效应，发现最优合同结构取决于环境。
This paper examines the question of how intellectual property rights in the software created during information technology outsourcing relationships should be divided. This paper expands on the property rights approach developed by Grossman, Hart, and Moore by recognizing that, with respect to software, it is possible to separate excludability rights from usability rights. These rights are modeled and the contractually optimal distribution is determined. This model is then modified to account for the possibility of cannibalization of the client’s benefit when multiple others are allowed use of the software. The results show that the best contractual structure depends strongly on the environment.