A Dynamic Framework of Noneconomic Goals and Inter-Family Agency Complexities in Multi-Family Firms
研究了多家族企业中因不同家族的非经济目标差异导致的复杂代理问题，并提出治理机制来限制机会主义行为，对研究家族企业治理的学者有参考价值。
Multi-family firms represent an important and complex type of family firm that is not as well understood as single-family firms. We develop a governance-based framework of the agency complexities in multi-family firms, theorizing that divergent family-centered noneconomic goals between the owning families create complex inter-family agency problems that are intensified by evolving family dynamics. We propose governance mechanisms that address these problems by limiting opportunistic behavior associated with the pursuit of noneconomic goals related to firm control, family altruism, social capital, and transgenerational succession. We then present a future research agenda that can expand our knowledge of multi-family firms.