Taxes and Turnout: When the Decisive Voter Stays at Home
构建了一个内生投票率和政策立场的政治竞争模型，发现领先政党可能采取有利于对手的政策以不对称地降低其投票率，并分析了这一机制对再分配税收政策的影响。
We develop a model of political competition with endogenous turnout and endogenous platforms. Parties trade off incentivizing their supporters to vote and discouraging the supporters of the competing party from voting. We show that the latter objective is particularly pronounced for a party with an edge in the political race. Thus, an increase in political support for a party may lead to the adoption of policies favoring its opponents so as to asymmetrically demobilize them. We study the implications for the political economy of redistributive taxation. Equilibrium tax policy is typically aligned with the interest of voters who are demobilized.