Strategic Withholding and Imprecision in Asset Measurement
研究了经理人可能声称不知情并隐瞒不利消息时，管理信息生产是否增加经济价值。通过嵌套最优说服机制于自愿披露框架，发现仅当存在不披露惩罚或披露成本时，最优报告策略会在最不利事件上呈现粗糙信息，并证明自愿披露环境下对坏消息的不精确报告是最优的。
ABSTRACT Does managing the production of information add value in economic environments where a manager may claim to be uninformed and withhold unfavorable news? We examine this question by nesting an optimal persuasion mechanism, controlling how evidence is organized, within a voluntary disclosure framework. Information has productive consequences because the firm uses it to make a continuous operating decision. The optimal reporting strategy features coarse information at the most unfavorable reported event if and only if the firm bears penalties for nondisclosure or positive disclosure costs. The model demonstrates the optimality of imprecise information over bad news in a voluntary disclosure environment, and that such imprecision increases the quality of public signals after considering strategic disclosure effects.