Optimal domestic redistribution and multinational monopoly
研究了当垄断企业为跨国所有时，政府如何通过一次性税收进行最优再分配，发现社会规划者不会使个人收入的社会边际效用相等，且垄断者总是优先定价。
Abstract Having a monopoly that is not owned domestically affects a country's income redistribution policies. Assume the government uses lump‐sum taxes to redistribute but cannot regulate the monopolist's price. In many relevant circumstances, a social planner would not equate social marginal utilities of income across individuals. Thus, using aggregate welfare functions as the preferences of a single representative consumer is valid only under restrictive circumstances. The monopolist always prefers to set price before the social planner chooses transfers, while the social planner may not have a first‐mover advantage. Under endogenous timing of their decisions, the government never moves before the monopolist.