A game of thrones—Dynamics of internal CEO succession and outcome
研究了美国大公司内部CEO继任的两种方式（明确接班人和赛马式竞争），发现赛马式继任会引发冲突、损害公司业绩，但对新任CEO个人未必不利。
Abstract We examine the implications of chief executive officer (CEO) succession methods for firm outcomes and executive incentives. Focusing on internal CEO successions, we find that the largest U.S. firms typically rely on two types of succession methods, namely, heir apparent and horse race successions. Although heir apparent and horse race CEO candidates have similar qualifications, the consequences of these two succession methods differ significantly. We find that horse race successions induce conflict and are detrimental to firm performance but not necessarily to the newly appointed CEOs. Our findings suggest succession method influences firm performance, executive incentives and CEO labour markets.