Persistent Blessings of Luck: Theory and an Application to Venture Capital
构建了一个动态委托投资模型，在不依赖技能差异的情况下解释风险投资绩效的持续性，并预测长期绩效的均值回归，对理解风险投资中的激励与匹配机制有参考价值。
Abstract Persistent performance in venture capital is routinely interpreted as evidence for skill. We present a dynamic model of delegated investment with endogenous fund heterogeneity and deal flow, which generates performance persistence without skill differences and predicts mean reversion in long-term performance. Investors working with multiple funds use contingent payments and tiered contracts to induce proper project nurturing and managerial effort. Successful funds receive continuation contracts that tolerate investment failure and encourage innovation, and subsequently finance entrepreneurs through a path-dependent assortative matching favoring incumbents. Recent empirical findings corroborate the model’s general implications, and the economic mechanisms are robust to short-term contracting, endogenous bargaining, and double moral hazard issues.