Stackelberg production-protection games: Defending crop production against intentional attacks
受伊拉克谷物生产区遭恐怖袭击启发，研究了两种斯塔克尔伯格博弈模型，其中领导者最大化产量，追随者破坏产量，并给出了领导者的最优策略算法。
Inspired by recent terrorist attacks on cereal production fields in Iraq, we introduce and study two types of Stackelberg games. In these games, the leader wants to maximize its production (e.g., cereal), while the follower tries to destroy this production as much as possible. In the first model, the leader can protect its production by spreading his production resources over multiple regions. In the second model, the leader can also decide to allocate some extra protection resources to the regions. For both games, we are interested in a follower’s and leader’s optimal strategy. We characterise optimal strategies for the follower and present two linear time algorithms (one for each game) that find an optimal strategy for the leader.